

Volume 5 / Number 1 / Winter 2008

WORLD WAR II QUARTERLY

WORLD WAR II QUARTERLY

Volume 5 / Number 1 / Winter 2008

Editorial Review Board

William F. Atwater • William H. Bartsch
Christopher M. Bell • Raymond A. Callahan
 Enrico Cernuschi • Roger Cirillo
 Carlo W. D'Este • Edward J. Drea
Christopher R. Gabel • David M. Glantz
 Russell A. Hart • Ashley Jackson
Donald A. Jordan • John B. Lundstrom
John C. McManus • Richard B. Meixsel
Richard R. Muller • Vincent P. O'Hara
Mark R. Peattie • E. Bruce Reynolds
 Roger F. Sarty • Mark A. Stoler
Barbara B. Tomblin • Simon Trew
Gregory J.W. Urwin • Nigel West
H.P. Willmott • Karl J. Zingheim

Executive Editor

Robert von Maier

World War II Quarterly is a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal dedicated to the study of the Second World War (all theaters of operation and areas of conflict, 1931-1945). Reproduction in whole or in part is strictly prohibited without prior written consent from the Editor.

Prior to submitting a manuscript, authors should contact the Editor for specific requirements and guidelines. All articles and essay-reviews will be refereed and may be edited for content. Unsolicited books reviews are not accepted.

Individual subscription rates are \$45.00 per annum (four issues). Institutional subscription rates are \$95.00 per annum (four issues). Checks should be in U.S. funds and made payable to: Pacific War Study Group.

© Pacific War Study Group, 2008 • All International Rights Reserved
ISSN 1559-8012 • Published in the United States of America
PO Box 131763, Carlsbad, CA 92013-1763
(760) 727-4355 • pacwar@gmail.com

Questions and Answers:

Antony Beevor

ROBERT VON MAIER
DAVID M. GLANTZ

Antony Beevor was educated at Winchester College and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, where he studied under Sir John Keegan. He is the author of several award-winning books, including *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin, 2006); *The Fall of Berlin 1945* (New York: Viking Press, 2002); *Stalingrad* (New York: Viking Press, 1998); *Crete: The Battle and The Resistance* (London: John Murray, 1991); and *Inside the British Army* (London: Chatto Windus, 1990).

Q: Are there any Second World War scholars who have been an important influence on you as a military historian?

A: The military historian who probably had the greatest influence on the way my interests developed was John Keegan, under whom I had studied at Sandhurst back in the 1960s. His book, *The Face of Battle*,¹ was quite revolutionary in its way. Military history had tended to be the province of retired senior officers who longed to impose an order on events and convey the self-deluding impression that commanders in the field were somehow akin to chess grandmasters. The fear, chaos, smoke, and erratic communications which Keegan portrayed in this early attempt at military history from below was the start of a necessary correction to the traditional top-down, corporate version of history.

During the 1980s, a fashion developed for oral history, with collections of letters, interviews, or diary extracts to convey the reality of those involved in the front line. But I remember feeling that this in itself was insufficient, since the context of the events depicted was missing. It was only when researching the battle of Stalingrad that it finally became clear to me that what was needed was an integration of top-down and bottom-up history, because only in that way could you convey the true effects of the decisions made, in say the Kremlin and Hitler's headquarters, on the lives of the soldiers and civilians caught up in the battle.

This realization happened to coincide, although it was not apparent until later, with a change in the attitudes and expectations of readers. The huge social, technological, geo-political, and economic changes of the mid- to late-1980s produced a major shift away from the collective loyalties of the past – for example, it was no coincidence that the demise of the traditional officer class in Britain coincided with the disintegration of the organized working class. The expectations of history followed suit, with people becoming far more interested in the experiences of individuals caught up in huge events rather than the old-fashioned corporate version of events.

In 1995, when I was about a year into the research on *Stalingrad*, the huge number of books marking the 50th anniversary of the end of the war failed to sell. Virtually everyone in publishing came to the conclusion that this more or less marked the end of the Second World War as a popular subject. Yet on the contrary, a huge growth in interest developed, partly I suspect because we live in a post-military, health and safety environment and people feel a great need to know what war, especially totalitarian war, was really like. John Keegan was ahead of his time.

Q: If you were asked to recommend five books that should be considered essential reading for anyone interested in the war in Europe (to include the Soviet-German War), what works would you select and what are the specific reasons for your selections?

A: I have to admit that I hate ranking or choosing the top books in any category. No book is definitive and there are many smaller books, such as W.G. Sebald's *On the Natural History of Destruction*² or the diary *A Woman in Berlin*,³ which should be included in any serious library of the Second World War. On general histories of the Nazi-Soviet war, one must include Malcolm Mackintosh's *Juggernaut*,⁴ John Erickson's two ground-breaking volumes, *The Road to Stalingrad* and *The Road to Berlin*,⁵ and of course David Glantz and Jonathan House's *When Titans Clashed*.⁶

The American official histories on North-West Europe written by Forrest Pogue and Martin Blumenson are in my opinion infinitely superior to anything produced by their British counterparts, partly because they were based on the work of the combat historians who interviewed participants often within a few weeks or even a few days of the events taking place. A brilliantly researched new book on France before and after D-Day is Peter Lieb's *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg? Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44*.⁷ One could go on and on, covering books on each theater of war or activity, whether intelligence or resistance, war in the air, or war at sea. In fact, there are obviously many excellent books, but to choose

the top five is well beyond me.

Q: Vis à vis the need for additional scholarship, what do you believe is the most under-examined aspect of 1) the Soviet-German War; 2) Great Britain and the Second World War; and 3) the Spanish Civil War?

A: Additional scholarship is always needed and in the case of the Soviet-German War, much work is needed in several areas. First of all, the siege of Leningrad requires a new appraisal and I will be very interested to see the results of Anna Reid's current research for her new book. For example, a colleague of mine recently discovered that Zhukov's attitude at the end of September 1941 was even more pitiless than that of Stalin himself. Directive No. 110/c, "written on the basis of the Coded order No. 4976 from the Commander of Leningrad Front comrade Zhukov," instructed commanders:

To make clear to all troops that all families of those who surrender to the enemy would be shot, and they themselves would be shot upon return from prison.

This goes much further than *Stavka* Order No. 270 and the "*Ni shagu nazad*" ("Not one step backwards") order of the following summer. It even surpasses the Nazi's *Sippenhaft* reprisals. Rogov, the chief of the political department of the Navy complained about this to Malenkov on 5 October. But whether the order was carried out or not is unclear.

The problem for all researchers at the moment, especially foreigners, is that access to the TsAMO archives at Podolsk has been severely curtailed since about 2000.⁸ In the current climate, this situation is most unlikely to improve. One certainly hopes that Russian historians will also take a more objective approach to material in their own archives which are at odds to the heroic myth of the Red Army as "liberators" in 1945. I was particularly depressed to be accused by the Russian media of being the chief slanderer of the Red Army for publishing among other things excerpts from the report of General Tsigankov, the chief of the political department of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which described the repeated and relentless rape by Red Army soldiers and officers of young women taken from the Soviet Union by the *Wehrmacht* for slave labor. Professor O.A. Rzheshesky even accused me of repeating Nazi propaganda, when in fact the bulk of the evidence on the subject came from Soviet sources, especially the NKVD reports in GARF,⁹ and a wide range of reliable personal accounts.

Much more material needs to be made available to clear up the debate over the relative importance of Operations Uranus (at Stalingrad) and Mars (at Rzhev), a subject which we will come onto in a moment. The same is true of many key operations, including the disastrous retreats

and encirclements of 1941 and the battle for Moscow.

I do not think that much more needs to be written on Great Britain and the Second World War, though I may well be proved wrong. The Spanish Civil War, on the other hand, is exciting a huge debate in Spain and elsewhere. In many ways this is healthy, in others it is a major problem for Spanish politics today, such as Prime Minister Zapatero's new law on the "Recuperation of Historical Memory," which is trying to control the history of the past through government decree. Rather like in France, when the Gaullist myth of the resistance put a bandage on a deep wound which was bound to suppurate later, the Spanish "Pact of Forgetting" after Franco's death when Spain suddenly fast forwarded into the future, the hurts of the past have infected the body politic. I was genuinely surprised by the reaction there to *The Battle for Spain* – I had assumed that the Spanish must be sick of Anglo-Saxon historians writing about their comparatively recent "black legend." Yet my Spanish publisher, (the book came out there in Spanish before appearing in an English-language version), assured me that they still needed an outsider's view. The myths and horrors of the Franquist regime, especially Franco's cold-blooded determination to crush all opposition, had already been well documented. Yet the real need, as I soon found, was to confront the far more attractive myths of the left, and this could only be done with the vast amount of new material available in Russian archives which had not been available when the major works on the subject were written some forty years ago. There is still much more to be done in this field, even though all Spanish sources have been exhaustively studied by young Spanish scholars, who have contributed enormously to our knowledge of this conflict.

Q: What is your reaction to the recent revelations regarding Soviet military strategy during November 1942, specifically, the relative importance of Operations Uranus (at Stalingrad) and Mars (at Rzhev)?

A: On the question of the debate launched by David Glantz's book, *Zhukov's Greatest Defeat*,¹⁰ comparing the Stalingrad and the Rzhev operations, I am the first to admit that I was completely taken aback when it came out a year after my book on Stalingrad. Glantz had clearly made a major contribution to the historiography of the war on the Eastern Front by focusing attention on this terrible bloodbath, which was shamefully buried by the Red Army authorities. But the key issue as far as Stalingrad was concerned was Glantz's argument that General Vasilevsky was uniquely responsible for Operation Uranus and General Zhukov for Operation Mars. After consulting John Erickson and Professor Rzhesheshevsky, (who, before he became outraged by my book on Berlin, was then extremely supportive of my work on Stalingrad), I be-

gan to have serious doubts about Glantz's thesis. Professor Rzheshesky did not appear to agree even with Glantz's basic assessment of Operation Mars as an unmitigated disaster. He stated in his address to the Stalingrad seminar here in London on 9 May 2000:

The main task of the operation [Mars] was achieved, because not a single [German] division was moved from the central part of the front to the southern part.

In conversations later, Professor Rzheshesky emphasized most strongly that Vasilevsky could never be regarded as the operational commander of Uranus because every decision had to be referred back to the *Stavka*, which basically meant Stalin. This was also supported by John Erickson who said that "neither Vasilevsky nor Zhukov had command prerogatives," and as *Stavka* representatives they were simply "reporting agents to Stalin." Vasilevsky's lack of staff and headquarters certainly seemed to confirm this reporting role.

I also rechecked the original article detailing Zhukov's movements.¹¹ These indicate convincingly that Zhukov spent far more time planning for Uranus than for Mars. From 1 September to 19 November 1942 inclusive, Zhukov spent nineteen days in Moscow, just eight and a half days on the Kalinin front, and no less than fifty-two and a half days on the Stalingrad axis. This rather striking imbalance surely puts paid to the theory that Zhukov was "obsessed" with Operation Mars and that Vasilevsky was some sort of independent supreme commander of Operation Uranus in the south. It also says a good deal about the priority in planning accorded to Uranus over Mars.

Professor Rzheshesky later sent me a copy of the deliberations of the Russian Association of Second World War Historians. While praising Glantz for all his work in uncovering so much detail on Operation Mars, their overall conclusion remained that Uranus was always intended to be the key operation and that Mars was a diversion. In their view, the key indicator was the respective artillery ammunition allocations. Operation Uranus received 80% more per gun than Mars. That fact alone, they felt, was conclusive. Quite clearly much more work needs to be done on the subject, but I fear that the lack of access to the relevant files in Podolsk is going to make that extremely difficult.

Q: What was the most important factor leading to the defeat of Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus' Sixth Army at Stalingrad?

A: It is very hard to identify "the most important factor" leading to the defeat of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, since it clearly came from a combination of false assumptions and bad decisions made in Hitler's headquarters, above all the way they underestimated the Red

Army's operational renaissance. But undoubtedly the crucial mistake made by Paulus, under pressure from Hitler, was to throw his *Panzer* formations into the battle for the city itself in a last attempt to take it before winter arrived. The lack of an armored reserve to counter-attack any assault on the flanks so weakly held by Romanian formations proved fatal. By the time the severity of the encircling offensive became clear, it was far too late to extract them and redeploy them.

Q: What importance do you attach to the multiple counterstrokes the Soviet Army conducted in the Kotluban' and Berezovka regions? How did they contribute to the ultimate defeat of the Sixth Army?

A: The multiple counterstrokes formed part of Operation Little Saturn, a scaled-down version of the perhaps over-ambitious plan for Operation Saturn. It was over-ambitious purely because of Stalin's impatience. He could have left the Sixth Army to starve where it was and deal with it later. But having underestimated the number of troops they had encircled in the Stalingrad *Kessel* and the determination of the Sixth Army's remnants to fight on, the *Stavka* had to recognize that they could not crush them and attempt to encircle the rest of Manstein's Army Group Don all in one go. The contribution of this operation to the final destruction of the Sixth Army could perhaps be described as a penultimate *coup de grace*, because it forced the rapid retreat of the German forces which were then attempting to break through to the Sixth Army in Operation Winter Storm.

Q: Which Soviet commander contributed most to the Soviet victory at Stalingrad and why?

A: I feel it is impossible to single out a particular Soviet general as the victor of Stalingrad. Without Chuikov's brutal determination, the last of the left bank of the Volga would have been overrun and the bait in the trap which so obsessed the German high command would have been rendered valueless. Operation Uranus succeeded principally, as I have said, because Paulus had no armored reserve. The exact division of responsibility for the planning of Uranus between Zhukov and Vasilevsky is hard to define, and I am sure that historians will continue to argue over this for years. Credit must also be given to Voronov. His reorganization of the artillery at Stalingrad was crucial to the survival of the 62nd Army, thus finally implementing the lesson of concentrating all their heavy artillery, which the Red Army had learned during the Spanish Civil War and reported back to Moscow but never dared implement in the Soviet-German war until then. Rokossovsky's conduct of Operation Ring, the final crushing of the *Kessel*, was also well-planned. So one really cannot

point to a single commander or planner as the victor.

Q: What were some of the influencing factors in your decision to re-search and write *The Fall of Berlin 1945*, which the *Daily Telegraph* described as "...a stunning exercise in historical writing"?

A: The decision to write *The Fall of Berlin 1945* after *Stalingrad* was very simple. At an early stage of my research into *Stalingrad*, I read the account of a junior German officer describing their frost-bitten march out of the city after Paulus's surrender. An elderly Soviet colonel pointed to the wrecked buildings around them and yelled in their faces that that was how Berlin was going to look. The psychological link between Stalingrad and Berlin on both sides appeared more and more strongly as I progressed. For the defeated Germans, it suddenly started to become clear that the Soviet advance would not stop until they reached Berlin, and the graffiti of Red Army soldiers on the massive pillars of the *Reichstag* tend to confirm this link between the two embattled cities.

Q: Why did the Soviets choose to conduct their offensive against Berlin in mid-April rather than early February on the heels of their spectacularly successful Vistula-Oder offensive?

A: The decision to postpone the "Berlin operation" in 1945 came from Stalin. Although advance units of the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 5th Shock Army had seized bridgeheads over the Oder after their triumphant charge westwards from the Vistula, the Soviet leader was afraid that the 1st Belorussian Front's supply lines were dangerously over-extended and he was nervous about a counter-attack from the exposed north flank, where German forces were hemmed into the "Baltic balcony." Chuikov, the commander of the 8th Guards Army, berated Zhukov for giving in on this point and the row continued after the war. It was one of the classic dilemmas of the successful commander after a headlong advance. Do you seize the opportunity when the enemy is totally disorganized, but also take on the risks associated with resupply, exhausted troops, and unserviced vehicles? Or do you consolidate your forces and secure your flanks even though it gives the enemy the chance to regroup and prepare defenses?

Q: Whom do you believe contributed most to the victory at Berlin, Marshal Georgi Zhukov or Marshal Ivan Konev, and why?

A: Of the two front commanders, Zhukov clearly was the conqueror of Berlin, but his conduct of the whole operation was far from impressive, as I describe in the book. He failed to carry out a proper reconnaissance

of the topography, which was unusual for him, but this was partly due to being summoned back to Moscow constantly by Stalin. In any case, he badly underestimated the defensive potential of the Seelow heights overlooking the Oder where he had chosen to attack. He then had the disastrous idea of using searchlights to blind the enemy during the attack, a ruse which succeeded only in illuminating his own men. He had also failed to take account of the standard German tactic to withdraw the majority of their front line troops at the last moment to avoid the worst effects of a Soviet bombardment. As a result, the massive fire-plan churned up the ground to little effect and delayed his own tank forces on the steep slopes. He then changed his mind about the order of attack, when the first phase went badly and caused total confusion in the bridge-heads. The list of mistakes goes on.

Ironically, even General Chuikov, so proud of his army forged in "the Stalingrad academy of street-fighting," forgot all the lessons which they had inflicted on the Sixth Army two and a half years before. Tank tactics in Berlin had to be rethought several times. And finally Zhukov, still believing he was under heavy pressure from Stalin for a rapid victory (when in fact Stalin had started to relax as soon as the city was surrounded, thus preventing any chance of the Americans getting there first to seize the nuclear materials), forced his armies on towards the center whatever the casualties. Many of these surely came from friendly fire as the different armies' supporting artillery and *Katyusha* batteries fired haphazardly ahead, even when their "neighbors" were in the way. I suspect, but cannot possibly prove, that a substantial minority of Soviet losses in the battle for Berlin came from their own ordnance and supporting air armies.

Q: How would you assess Marshal Georgi Zhukov's performance as a front commander?

A: I would agree entirely with David Glantz that Zhukov's performance as a front commander has been greatly inflated, especially by western historians, and his brutality has not been fully appreciated. Apart from his order in Leningrad to shoot the families of those who surrendered, he was the prime mover in August 1942 behind the implementation of blocking groups to enforce Order No. 227, even using tanks manned by selected officers to shoot down those who retreated. It must be said that this was not entirely an innovation. In the Spanish Civil War, as well as the Russian civil war, blocking groups with machine guns to kill waverers had already been used. But Zhukov's reputation as the Ivan's friend and hero was a grotesque invention. His mystic aura, the Saint Georgii who saved Moscow in 1941, is based almost entirely on that battle alone. As already mentioned, his exact contribution to the plan for Operation

Uranus will remain undecided until more files on the subject become available.

Q: Another important addition to the literature is your book *Crete: The Battle and the Resistance*. Would you discuss a few of the details regarding this particular volume, and how does it differ from other works on the subject?

A: I wish I had had more time when writing *Crete: The Battle and the Resistance* because there is a lot more to be said on the subject. This came about because I had agreed to write the book in time for the 50th anniversary of the battle. It is a mistake which I will never make again, but the basis of the book is still absolutely valid.

As far as the battle was concerned, the research did at least reveal for the first time quite clearly that the whole Allied disaster stemmed from General Freyberg's outdated conviction that no island could be captured by airborne assault alone, and therefore that there had to be a naval landing. Because of this *idée fixe*, Freyberg misconstrued the ULTRA intelligence he was given and the defense plan suffered accordingly. When the parachute invasion began on 20 May 1941, Freyberg held back the New Zealand division responsible for defending Maleme airfield, mainly because of his misplaced fear of a major amphibious assault.

In contrast, the Australians at Rethymno airfield and the British at Heraklion counter-attacked the paratroopers immediately, preventing any chance of reinforcement with air-landing troops in their sector. But once Maleme airfield was lost and Freyberg delayed the counter-attack, the German airborne forces had their foothold and were able to fly in the 5th Mountain Division to support the badly battered *Fallschirmjäger* regiments. It was probably the most unnecessary defeat of the Second World War.

The other objective of the book was to prepare the ground for a history of the Cretan resistance. At the time, the reports of SOE were still classified, but Patrick Leigh Fermor, who organised the successful kidnapping of General Kreipe in 1944, was privately given copies of all the reports and he passed them on to me. And these sources, combined with other material assembled on Crete, enabled me to provide that skeleton history of the Cretan resistance from 1941-1945, which local historians have continued to develop.

Q: Several of your books have included eyewitness reports and interviews with participants. Please tell us why this type of material is so important to military historians.

A: The issue of non-archival sources for military historians is naturally a

contentious subject. Attitudes vary from country to country. In Germany until quite recently, there was a feeling among academic historians that no serious historian should ever quote from non-official sources. But are official documents any more reliable than private ones? There are all too many cases of senior officers attempting to protect their own reputations and justify their actions.

I think that there are reasonably straight-forward rules covering the use of personal accounts, whether from private or archival sources. The most reliable are contemporary accounts by those who have no axe to grind. For example, when writing *Stalingrad*, the most dependable accounts I found were those of officers and NCOs interviewed immediately after they were flown out of the *Kessel*. They clearly felt a need to testify accurately as to the conditions they had left behind, if only out of loyalty to their comrades who had been abandoned. I also found invaluable the reports of priests and doctors attached to German divisions at Stalingrad, both of whom were outsiders in the military organization yet also keen observers of the human condition. When I mentioned this to the Russian colonel at the ministry of defense in Moscow who was to approve my access to the Podolsk archive, he roared with laughter and shook his finger. "No priests in the Red Army," he said. I replied that perhaps the political department reports would be interesting. As it turned out, this was indeed the case.

But what about letters which are also contemporary documents? Soldiers writing from Stalingrad, as one might imagine, did not want to dwell on their suffering to spare their families at home. Letters can still be useful, but diaries are much more reliable. For *The Fall of Berlin* I found that women diarists, who knew that they were living through a key moment in history, recorded everything with great exactitude.

Eyewitness accounts, especially those produced long after the event, are notoriously unreliable. But what I have found is that, providing you do not rely on them for dates or matters of vital detail, they can be extremely useful. The interviewee, who may not remember what happened a couple of weeks ago, can have a very vivid recall of their experiences in what was the most impressionable moment of their lives. Intriguingly, I found that Soviet soldiers who had fought at Stalingrad had a clearer memory of what had happened during that battle than later in the battle for Berlin. But there were dangers. Many of them had read Soviet official accounts and had refiltered their own memories through what they had learned later. But this affected more general events, and not personal experiences.

I remember discussing all this with Anne Applebaum, then researching her book on the Gulag, over dinner in Moscow at a restaurant just off the Arbat. We discussed the problems of interviewing Russians and agreed that Russian women were usually excellent witnesses. They had

kept their mouths shut and their eyes open. But Russian men, Anne said, tended to tell you to sit down, and not to interrupt while they told you what happened. She asked me whether this was because she was a woman. I replied that I had encountered very similar reactions. But it was only on my way home in the metro that night that I found some sort of explanation. Russian men, unlike the women, felt a need to control the past because they still could not admit the humiliation – their sense of impotence – during the totalitarian years. Their telling of the story was the only way they had of exerting any control over a life whose course and fate had been dictated entirely by others, often in an utterly arbitrary and senseless fashion. In the end, I found for these and other reasons that I included very little from my interviews with Red Army veterans, and, with only a couple of notable exceptions, very little from interviews with *Wehrmacht* veterans. But the background detail they provided, to say nothing of the military jargon and slang, was always useful. The importance of personal evidence is very much tied up with what I said earlier about the need for history from below as well as from above and the relationship between the two.

Q: Are you presently working on any new World War II book projects? If so, would you share a few of the details regarding the work?

A: I am currently working on a history of D-Day, in fact the invasion of Normandy from the beaches to the Liberation of Paris. Countless books have been written on the subject and yet there is a huge amount of unused material, some old, some new. I mentioned earlier the work of the U.S. Army combat historians. This is a huge and valuable source, which was used as background material by the official historians of the time, but never quoted from. There is also a vast amount of "new" material, which means diaries and contemporary accounts which have been donated by families to various archives, above all to the *Mémorial de Caen*. This includes letters, diaries, and personal accounts from French civilians and soldiers, but also from Canadian soldiers, Poles, Americans, British, and Germans. I feel overwhelmed by the sheer quantity – literally thousand of pages of photocopies from over thirty archives in half a dozen countries. And the marshaling of all this data bank, a process which I have just started, is an alarming task. In any case, if the book is no good, it will certainly not be due to the lack of fresh raw material.

Editor's Notes

1. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme* (London: Penguin, 1976).
2. W.G. Sebald, *On the Natural History of Destruction* (London: Penguin, 2003).
3. Anonymous, *A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in the Conquered City - A Diary* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954).

4. Malcolm Mackintosh, *Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1967).
5. John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany, Vol. 1* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975); *The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany, Vol. 2* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983).
6. David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995).
7. Peter Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg? Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007).
8. *Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony RF* (TsAMO RF) or Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
9. *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (GARF) or State Archive of the Russian Federation.
10. David M. Glantz, *Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
11. S.I. Isaev, "Vekhi frontovogo puti," *VIZh*, No. 10, October 1991, pp. 22-25.